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A ROAD NOT TAKEN: HARRY WELLINGTON, LEGAL
PROCESS AND ADJUDICATION
ANTHONY SEBOK*

I had just flown in from the American Association of Law Schools'
faculty recruitment conference on the day that the paper upon which
this article is based was delivered in Dean Wellington's honor. I had
been interviewing prospective law professors who were interested in
joining the ranks of academe. There was a certain poeticjustice to that
coincidence, since, as I flew to New York to give this paper, I thought
about the complex construction of generations within the world of academic law. In the same day in which I was helping to honor Dean
Wellington, who had been a teacher of mine, I had interviewed many
people who wanted to become new professors. This led me to think
back on how, when I was preparing for the transition to law teaching,
Dean Wellington had given me a great deal of support. His support
was especially important to me because Dean Wellington had been,
during his early career, a major figure in a generational transition between legal realism and legal process. This transition took place at the
very intersection of legal philosophy and constitutional interpretation,
and Dean Wellington actively encouraged me to write about it, giving
me the benefit of his first-hand recollections and critical thoughts.'
This symposium offers a wonderful opportunity to revisit some of
the themes with which I grappled while I was Dean Wellington's student and in my early years as a scholar. I was especially interested in
the peculiar place that the Legal Process School occupied in the history of American jurisprudence. The Legal Process School served as a
crucial transitional moment between Legal Realism and the theoretical
movements of the 1970's, such as the Fundamental Rights approach or
Critical Legal Studies. I had tried in my earlier work to situate the
Legal Process School in the larger tradition of Legal Positivism, but
that analysis did not allow me to appreciate the details and quality of
the transition between these movements. Therefore, I would like to
*
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take this opportunity to now consider how the concept of "generational change" provides a lens with which to understand one of the
most important works of the Legal Process School, Dean Wellington's
2
Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards.
Common Law Rules represents an early and sophisticated approach
to deal with the "countermajoritarian difficulty" that had been raised
by Dean Wellington's colleague, Alexander Bickel. 3 Bickel's work had
not come out of a vacuum. It was a product of a debate among American law professors over the appropriate way to explain Brown v. Board of
Education and its progeny. While the issues were diverse, a growing
sense developed that the Legal Process School lacked a robust commitment to the Warren Court.4 Certainly Herbert Wechsler's skeptical review of the Court in his 1959 Holmes Lectures gave many liberals
pause about the compatibility between any sort of commitment to
"neutral principles" and the aggressive pursuit of civil rights.5 Bickel
picked up where Wechsler had left off, and recommended that the
Court should defer even in the face of principle in order to preserve its
6
special role as arbiter between the political branches.
Bickel was skeptical of the existence of principles in constitutional
law. He alluded to this skepticism early in his career in The Least Dangerous Branch, and by 1970 he had developed a form of value-skepticism. He wrote that, although perhaps the concepts of justice and
injustice once had stable content, "[t] he words are used in a different
sense now [by 1970] because they are no longer rooted in a single,
well-organized ethical precept."'7 Such value relativism, which, in today's "culture wars" would normally be associated with the academic
left, served to buttress the doctrine of judicial restraint that, at that
2. Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) [hereinafter CLR].
3.

See
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BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

4.
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(1962);

ALEXANDER

(1970).

See SEBOK at 183-87.

5. Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1959). Typical responses included Addison Mueller and Murray L. Schwartz,
The Principle of Neutral Principles,7 UCLA L. Rv. 571 (1960); Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661
(1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
6.

See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS at 173; see also Edward A. Purcell,Jr., Alexander M.

Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARP. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 521, 554 (1976).
7.

BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS at 81.
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time, was one of the hallmarks of the Republican Party's approach to
the federal courts.8
By the late 1960's the Legal Process School was in a peculiar position. It was, on the one hand, the dominant approach to American
law, while on the other hand it was losing support among newer and
more liberal scholars. Legal process was at a critical moment in its
history, even if there was no palpable sense of crisis.9
Some younger liberals reacted to legal process by rejecting it in
toto. What I find more interesting are those who tried to reinterpret
Hart & Sacks in a way that would give their theory an application that
was not as conservative and pessimistic as Wechsler and Bickel. The
scholars who tried to preserve the best parts of legal process while
pushing it forward to meet the new political realities of the civil rights
era were, in my view, a "silent" generation of legal process scholars,
unheralded as such (partially because there was no longer any benefit-and some risk-to seizing upon that label). In that group, two of
the most significance were Harry Wellington and Ronald Dworkin. In
a sense one might say that both left the house of Hart & Sacks to seek
their own identities within the framework of their intellectual fathers
in the Legal Process School.
Wellington makes his debt to Hart & Sacks explicit in Common Law
Rules. He dedicated it, for example, to Henry Hart. The examples
with which he begins the article are admittedly borrowed from The Legal Process. Although I am not speaking today about Dworkin, I will
note that I am not the only person to have seen Hart & Sacks in the
roots of Dworkin's theory. 10 I say this even though Dworkin's work
barely acknowledges Hart & Sacks. There is only one reference to
Hart & Sacks in TakingRights Seriously. And yet the distinction between
principle and policy, the anchor concept in Wellington's Common Law
Rules, is also the anchor concept of Ronald Dworkin's early works, especially his first published piece, which appeared in a philosophyjour8.

See RONALD DWORRIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133-137 (1977).

9. See SEBOK at 179; see alsoJan Vetter, PostwarLegal Scholarship on JudicialDecision
Making, 30J. LEGAL EDUC. 412, 414 (1978) (Hart & Sacks met a "formidable opponent
in the Warren Court"); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATrERNS OF AMERIcAN LEGAL THOUGHT 150
(1978).
10. See Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of
Hart & Sacks, 29 ARiz. L. Rnv. 413, 470-1 (1987). (Wellman ultimately concludes that
despite affinities with Dworkin, Hart & Sacks' jurisprudential views were obscure; if any
anything, "their views about the nature of laws suggests a positivistic orientation").
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nal, and then of course his more famous law review articles. 11 So we
see at the outset of the late 60's and early 70's an attempt to come to
terms with the legacy of Hart & Sacks on the part of these two favorite
(and soon to be famous) sons. I think the difference is that Wellington did carry forward Hart & Sacks' project whereas I cannot say the
same thing for Ronald Dworkin. As original and important as his work
is, it lacks a clear connection with its patrimony. Whether it suffers for
that lack is not the subject of this speech.
So I want to talk a little bit about the influence of Hart & Sacks on
Wellington's project in Common Law Rules because it explains the peculiar structure of its argument. The article self-consciously holds off
from reaching questions of constitutional law until late into its argument and dwells instead on the nature of private law and statutory interpretation. In doing so Wellington patiently returned to a debate
that had been the main focus of the Legal Process School's jurisprudence until conservative anxiety over the Warren Court's "activism"
pushed constitutional law onstage. Had the Legal Process School's private law project been allowed to mature I think that it would have,
ironically, led to a more successful and attractive legal process effort in
constitutional interpretation than what we got, which was Bickel and
his allies, Philip Kurland and Robert Bork.
Approaching constitutional law as a common law subject is a better approach and it was exactly this sort of approach to legal process
and constitutional theory that Dean Wellington tried to express in his
1990 book. 12 It is an academic question whether there was some way
that the more liberal approach endorsed by Dean Wellington could
have been "sold" more effectively to supporters of the Warren Court. I
think it is safe to say that, of the many fellow travelers of legal process
whose loyalty was up for grabs by 1973, most of the more self-consciously liberal and theoretically sophisticated ultimately opted for the
Dworkinian movement. I have written about the jurisprudential consequences of this choice elsewhere.' 3 In this speech I want only to examine the nature of Dean Wellington's debt to Hart & Sacks, and,
more specifically, the role of common law adjudication in both sets of
theories.
11.
Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963) and see, e.g., The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967).
12. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
13.

See SEBOK at 206-216.
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For the project of Common Law Rules, Dean Wellington focuses on
the central trope of the Legal Process School, which is the idea of common law adjudication as the central explanatory lens by which to understand all American law. 14 Like Lon Fuller, Wellington viewed
common law methodology as more than a specialized form of legal
reasoning in certain ancient English forms of action, such as contracts
and torts. He viewed it as a summary of the approach to all forms of
adjudication which, for better or worse, had been adopted by the
American legal system. In this Wellington was clearly picking up on
one of the most important points of consensus between Hart & Sacks
and Fuller, and therefore anchored his argument in the major liberal
post-realist theories that dominated American law after the Second
World War.1 5 Wellington was convinced that the lessons of the legal
process could be applied to constitutional law only indirectly and only
in two separate steps. First, the constitutional theorist had to take her
eye off of the problems of constitutional law and dwell briefly in the
quotidian world of private law; only then could she take the lessons
learned in the latter realm and apply it to the former. That is because,
in constitutional as in private law, Wellington argued, the problem
raised by Bickel is the same. The fact that in a torts decision the legislature could correct ajudge who decided "wrongly" doesn't change the
problem for a common law judge who wants to get it right.
Common Law Rules began, therefore, with an examination of the
foundation of our approach to contracts and tort, which is the distinction between policy and principle. Wellington said in every legal rule
there is going to be ajustification for the legal rule. Notice that in the
beginning of the article, Wellington used the expression "legal rule."
An interesting point about Common Law Rules, (which is ultimately not
theoretically important is that at the outset Wellington chose to omit a
distinction that Hart & Sacks found crucial-the distinction between
rules and standards. 16 Without comment, Wellington simply referred
to any legal norm (whether a rule or as standard) as a "rule." This may
have been because he was very concerned not to confuse the special
legal process terms borrowed from Hart & Sacks with the terminology
of "double standards," which had been introduced by Wechsler in his
14.

See Anthony J. Sebok, Reading THE LEGAL PROCESS, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1571,

1578-79 (1996).
15.

See SEBOK 113-130.

16.
See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139-40 (1958); SEBOK at 139.
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criticisms of the Warren Court's varying treatment of economic legislation and civil liberties legislation under the test of substantive due
process.
Legal rules are norms that are underpinned and underwritten by
either principles or policies. The distinction between principles and
policies is by now quite familiar. Wellington defined a principle by
contrasting it to a policy. A policy is an instrumentalist motivation for
17
a rule and a principle is a non-instrumentalist motivation for a rule.
Wellington used "the case of the murderous heir" as an example of a
rule undergirded by principle and "the case of the disappointed cantaloupe buyer" as an example of a rule undergirded by policy.' 8 Wellington's first point is that, although we have two rules with different modes
of justification, the justifications do not generate unique results in
these cases. Wellington noted that the outcome in the murderous heir
case probably could be justified by policy and the outcome in the cantaloupe case probably could have been justified by principle. But
nonetheless, no one doubts that they are in fact equally effective rules
with different justifications, and that in fact the applications of the
rules depended on the justifications actually used. There is a suggestion at this early stage in the article that the point that rules and principles are distinguishable only by their justifications will have practical
value at some point.
And at the end of the Common Law Rules, of course, Wellington
does show us why it is worth noticing that, notwithstanding the capacity
of both principle and policy to guide the application of the same rule,
a rule's rationale matters. In common law it seems to matter only
when it comes to remedies: policy cannot support retroactive remedies, which make the loser pay for legal progress. 19 While remedies
are important, they did not seem to occupy American jurisprudence in
1973 as much as they did in earlier years. When it comes to constitutional law, whether or not the rationale for the constitutional rule is a
principle or a policy may be crucial, especially in the debate over the
nature and scope of judicial review. The question of whether or not
we should (or could) justify judicial application of common law rules
in contract and tort cases hardly ever arises. Typically, as long as stand17. CLR at 222-23.
18. Id. These examples, as noted above, were explicitly borrowed from The Legal
Process.
19. Id. at 233.
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ing and jurisdiction is satisfied, judicial power to apply the rules of
private law seems to us quite salutary.
But, as Bickel noted, with regard to judicial review we do need to
know which justification underpins the legal rule. Bickel's argument,
put in legal process language, is that if the rationale for judicial review
is in fact a policy, then Hart & Sacks's own theory says that often the
court should in fact refuse to even take the case, and by default should
in fact leave it to the legislature. 20 On the other hand, if the rationale
is rooted in principle then the justification for this extraordinary exercise of power is more likely to be persuasive. 2 1 And so it is only at the
very end of the article, once we are looking at specifically constitutional rules, that the carefully drawn distinction between rationales for
rules proves its practical value.
Wellington's contribution here cannot be understated. The applicability of the legal process structure of policy and principle to constitutional law is something Hart & Sacks did not discuss in print. It has
been noted, that, as a general matter, The Legal Process hardly mentions
constitutional law. There is every reason to believe that Hart & Sacks
planned a chapter on constitutional law for their unfinished manuscript, but we can only speculate what it would have contained, and
why, even after four iterations, they did not (it seems) even begin to
draft the chapter. 22 While Wellington was not the first to take The
Legal Processinto the thicket of constitutional theory, he (and Dworkin)
were the only scholars to use Hart & Sacks's sophisticated theory of law
and terminology, and Wellington was the only one to use it faithfully.
Having located the place and origins of the principle/policy distinction, we must now analyze its content. One mistake that is sometimes made is to look at Hart & Sacks's use of the word 'policy' and to
20. As Wellington notes, Bickel's case against judicial review is strengthened by his
(partial) adoption of Hart & Sacks vocabulary, since in The Legal Process (and in Henry
Hart's 1959 Harvard Foreword) legal process articulated the critical differences between the Supreme Court and the political branches' institutional competencies.
Where courts are applying rules grounded on policy, they must take considerations of
institutional competency very seriously, since the strongest reason for giving a court
power that could otherwise be exercised by a public or private decision maker is that
the policy issue to be solved is somehow best handled through adjudication (as opposed
to the market, or majority vote, or administrative discretion). See CLR at 240.
21. CLR at 243. Up to this point Wellington's legal process analysis of judicial
review is strikingly similar to Dworkin's.
22. SeeWilliam N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, An Historicaland CriticalIntroduction to The Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS, at lxxxviii, and Sebok, Readingat 1578
n.26.
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assume that it refers to some form of free-wheeling preference satisfaction. 23 As Wellington pointed out in Common Law Rules, policy is far
less subjective then one might think.24 Wellington subjected policy as
a legal instrument-as an instrument forjudges-to the same demandingjurisprudential criteria that he subjected principle. That is, it must
be susceptible to adjudication. Among other things, the practical action at issue must be regarded with neutrality by the court and the
court must possess institutional competencies that make it the best
body to interpret the policy. Thus, the two criteria he sets out for policies that are part of law (as opposed to policies that are part of politics)
are that they be "widely regarded as socially desirable and are neutral"
25
between competitors for the same social good.
Wellington's definition of policy picks up on a strand of legal process that has been somewhat ignored. Hart & Sacks as well as Fuller
thought that a key feature of law (and, more specifically, adjudication)
is the contrast between court-centered and "polycentric" decision-making. At one extreme, court-centered decision making is adversarial,
mediated by a nonparty, and based on reason, not preference or intensity of desire. 26 This is in contrast to pure expressions of political partial preference such as the judicial creation of a subsidy for a fledgling
industry as a remedy to a tort suit 27 or the imposition of collective bargaining as a remedy to a common law contract claim. 28 As Wellington
noted, industrial subsidies or labor unions may be socially desirable,
but the choice for these things (which means by definition a choice
againstsomeone else's interest) cannot bring out a neutral application
of tort or contract law. Even though it may be the better social policy,
judicial imposition of collective bargaining would 'justify rules by accepting the demands of one interest group at the expense of another
23. For a version of this argument, see Jan Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the
Supreme Court: Some IntersectionsBetween Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169,
192-93 (1968).
24. Policy includes instrumentalism in method, but not ad hoc redistribution of
benefits. Thus, Wellington's legal process definition of policy (which is narrower than
Hart & Sacks) is very different than Dworkin's. For Dworkin, the preference of one city
to another in an appropriations bill is an expression of "policy" in the legal system. See
DWORKIN at 22. Wellington disagrees. CLR at 233.
25.
CLR at 226
26.
See Sebok, Reading, supra note 14 at 1581-82.
27. CLR at 226
28.
CLR at 236. This is an especially interesting example, given that one of Wellington's major fields of scholarship was at the time labor law.
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'innocent' group, that may not even be a party to the litigation." 29 A
legislature could order this through carefully drawn legislation, which
then would require courts to apply the law, in part through the identification of the law's policy rationale(s).
Therefore, even at the outset, many subjective preferences get
taken out of consideration in the domain of adjudication outlined by
Wellington. What is left are a very narrow range of policies that fit
Hart & Sacks's model of shared social desirability and neutrality. As
seen in the example above, neutrality does a lot of work. Many options
that might seem to have been viewed as producing a great deal of social welfare, and hence may have been properly available to hardcore
realists like Jerome Frank or FlemingJames are deemed a priorioutside
the reach of adjudication. All this occurs even before one considers
the limitations placed on adjudication by institutional competency,
which Wellington spent less time examining in Common Law Rules than
one might expect, given its debt to The Legal Process. He simply noted
that considerations of institutional competency are clearly related to
the ultimate "social desirability" of achieving a certain policy through
the courts. Put plainly, since courts are bad at investigating and developing pubic policy, they are probably not as good as legislatures in
determining which policies maximize welfare.3 0
The other possible rationale for a legal rule is principle. What is it
that we mean when we talk about principle? Here, as with policy, there
is a temptation to give a definition that is too broad. Principle does
not mean, as Dworkin would have it, morality simpliciteror principle as
viewed in its "best light." Wellington argued that principle, when used
by the Legal Process School, must refer to society's "conventional morality." By conventional morality Wellington meant something very different from what he describes as moral ideals, which may be honored
29. CLR at 238
30. C.R at 240. Earlier legal process scholars emphasized institutional competency more than Wellington, whose decision to bundle it inside of "social desirability"
seems a bit odd. See Hart & Sacks, (citing Lon Fuller), and SEBOK 144-145; ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 90-91 (1984); Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HAuv. L. REv. 1281 (1976); A good example of the sort of limits to which
Wellington alludes is in the area of tort law. Jim Henderson famously developed the
argument that "polycentric" decision making was inconsistent with an adjudication-centered model of tort law because adjudication is not designed to revisit settled issues,
facilitate negotiation between self-interested parties, and accommodate inconsistent results. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 901
(1982).
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far more often in their breach than in their instantiation. 3 1 Furthermore, by conventional morality Wellington made clear that, epistemically, the relationship between the individual and the group is the
opposite of how Dworkin imagined it. Legal principles, such as rights,
are not, for Wellington, defined in the face of majority preferences:
they are wholly constructed by them, although not crudely, as if by
'instant' votes that might take the temperature of society's current passions. This is such an important point that it is worth reprinting the
critical paragraph from Common Law Rules in its entirety, since only by
reading it all the way through can one fully appreciate the uncanny
way in which Wellington's approach to principle is almost the inverse
reversal of what Ronald Dworkin has written.
I claimed in effect that when dealing with legal principles
a court must take the moral point of view. Yet I doubt
that one would want to say that a court is entitled or required to assert its moral point of view. Unlike the moral
philosopher, the court is required to assert ours. This requirement imposes constraints: Judicial reasoning in concrete cases must proceed from society's set of moral
principles and ideals, in much the same way that the judicial interpretation of documents (contracts, statutes, constitutions-especially constitutions) must proceed from
the document. And that is why we must be concerned
with conventional morality, for it is there that society's set
32
of moral principles and ideals are located.
This is the ultimate reversal of Hercules. The familiar natural law
approach to principle was to use it like a telescope with which the
judge could do nothing else other than look-carefully and in great
detail-at her own moral compass. Wellington's idea was that the
careful and detailed gaze of principle would be retained, but that the
telescope would be turned around and used to look at the moral compass of society. For Wellington, a society's morality, like its fashion and
art, can sustain its normative force and conventionality because it is a
shared and observed social practice. 33 This is in contrast to an individ31.
CLRat 245.
32. CLR at 244
33. The idea that law is best understood as a complex set of conventions has always lurked in the background of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The role of conventionality in law has been thoughtfully and persuasively explored by Jules Coleman in his
recent work. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, (Oxford University
Press, 2001).
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ual's personal morality, which binds each person only to the degree
it and commit to it using their powers
that they can ultimately accept
34
of reason and judgment.
Wellington stressed, however, that although conventional morality
is a product of society, and not pure reason, it a special from of conventionalism. It is not the conventionalism of voting or of taking a
poll. Wellington contrasted his method of discerning society's principles from the social scientist's method of analyzing the "real world" of
power at a given moment in a given society.3 5 He explicitly separated
his project from that of the political scientists like Robert Dahl and
politics
David Truman, whose pathbreaking work on interest group
36
was (correctly) identified with the Legal Process School.
In repudiating the methods of the value-neutral pluralists in this
part of his argument, Wellington made what is, I think, the most interesting move in the piece. I want to focus on it because it has not been
commented on very much, if at all, in the scholarly literature on legal
process. Wellington recognized at this point in Common Law Rules that
he needed to work with a very different set of tools if he was to come
up with an account of "principle as conventional morality" that would
not fall into the reductive and circular problems which the critics of
social science had noted.3 7 Wellington suggested therefore, that the
analysis of conventional morality should occur in the "philosophical
temple" instead of the "research institute," and that the researcher
should not use "scientific methodology" but something like ordinary
language philosophy.3 8 In making this claim, he invoked the authority
of Stanley Cavell, who was, at the time, a member of the new generation of Oxbridge-influenced "ordinary language philosophers" who
were bringing the ideas of Wittgenstein to the philosophy of science,
knowledge, and language. Thus, Wellington, by quoting Cavell (at
length), introduced into Common Law Rules a sophisticated Wittgensteinian foundation for his argument that, in law, principle should be
discovered in the conventions of the group bound by those principles.
Cavell had been talking about the failure of behavioral science to adequately analyze language, but Wellington saw in Cavell's criticism of
behaviorism a similar problem with value-neutral political science's
treatment of social conventions.
94 (1963).

34.

See CLR at citing R.M. HARE,

35.

CLR at 246

36.

See SEBOK at 171-74; see also Carl Landauer, DeliberatingSpeed: TotalitarianAnxieYAiEJ.L. & HUMAN. 171 (2000).
See Deutsch, supranote 23.
CLR at 247.

ties and PostwarLegal Thought ,12

37.
38.

FREEDOM AND REASON
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Cavell argued that behaviorism cannot explain how language exercises normative force on its users. The goal of behaviorism, which
Cavell mockingly referred to as"count[ing] noses," is to identify the
rules that pre-exist the use of language by a speaker. 39 Under the behaviorist model, correct language use is the product of the conscious
or unconscious obedience to rules. We discover the rules by observing
what "most people" do. Cavell, following Wittgenstein, rejected the
idea that the rules of a language could be determined simply by observing the behavior of others. The "rules" that are at issue are not
sensible outside of their use. One cannot extract them from a sample
set, state them bare and without context, and then apply them to a new
set of circumstances without doing violence to one's initial project,
which was (one assumes) to master the language. Wittgenstein argued
against the idea that behind every language there are a set of "superlative facts" that govern the formation of a sentence in that language; the
only fact about the language available to a competent user of the language is the language itself.40 Language is normative, but its rules are
neither discoverable nor describable through the methods of natural
science. The rules of language are discoverable only through practice
and are knowable only through ostention. 4 1 Under the Wittgensteinian approach, "behavioral science methodology is suspect" when
studying social conventions, since it distracts the researcher from her
true task, which is to immerse oneself in one's subject matter and to
understand it by practicing it, not seeking distance through "'value
free' research. "42

Wellington's special insight was to notice that someone who is
charged with the responsibility of interpreting conventional morality
has to think about morality the way the linguist or grammarian thinks
about the grammar of their society's language game. One might be
skeptical about the parallel between morality and language. This is not
the place for a full discussion of the motivation and utility of treating

39.

CLR at 247 (quoting Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say, in ORDINARY

LANGUAGE: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 78 (V.C. Chappel, ed. 1964)).

40. See G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, MITTGENSTEIN, RULES, GRAMMiAR AND NECESsrry 171-72 (1985) ("The pivotal point in Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules is
that a rule is internally related to acts which accord with it. The rule and nothing but
the rule determines what is correct.")
41. To teach by ostensive example is to teach by example. See AnthonyJ. Sebok,
FindingWittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition, 52 S.M.U. L. REv. 75, 91 (1999)
(citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 6 (G.E.M. Anscombe,
trans., 2d ed. 1958)).
42.

CLR at 248 (quotes in the original).
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language as a model for conventional norms. 43 My main goal in this
speech is to point out that Wellington made such a move in Common
Law Rules and to locate his contribution in the wider context of philosophical scholarship of the time. However, I would note that, in language, Wellington found a congenial analog. First, like language,
social morality is ultimately subjective. No one would want to say any
given grammatical modality is "better" than another (nationalism
aside, few people come to blows over the issue of whether German is
"'more grammatical" than French because of its approach to the subjunctive); and on many matters of social behaviors (some of which may
in fact even be measurable from an objective point of view) it seems
both senseless and imperialistic to say that American practices (for example, our tort system) are "more moral" than the Germans' (where
tort damages are much lower). Second, like language, social morality
cannot be legislated or governed by a single deliberative authority.
Wellington quoted H.L.A. Hart, who noted that "moral rules or principles cannot be brought into being or changed or eliminated" by "deliberate enactment," like the traffic code, which can make an entire
nation shift from driving on the right to the left overnight. 44
It may strike some as odd that Wellington based his analysis of
moral convention in Wittgenstein and Hart, but it should not. As I
have argued elsewhere, there was a strong affinity between post-war
legal positivism, as articulated by H.L.A. Hart in Oxford, and legal process, as articulated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in Harvard. 4 5 It
should not surprise us, therefore, given that Wellington was trying to
carry forward Hart & Sacks' legal process project, that Wellington
would embrace H.L.A. Hart. Common Law Rules offers a deep insight
into the connection between legal process and positivism because it
highlights their common interest in a certain kind of Wittgensteinian
analysis of social convention. It is no accident that Wellington quoted,
at length, H.L.A. Hart and Stanley Cavell within two pages of each
other in his article. The rule of recognition, which Hart held out as
the normative foundation of a legal system, is a validation rule that
itself cannot be validated by legal reasons. 46 Hart noted that:
[w]e only need the word 'validity', and commonly only
use it, to answer questions which arise within a system of
43. For a discussion within the Wittgensteinian context, see BRIAN BIx, LANGUAGE
AND LEGAL DErERMINACY (1993); Thomas Moravetz, UnderstandingDisagreement,the Root
Issue ofJurisprudence:Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, CriticalTheoy, andjudging,141 U.
PA. L. REv. 371 (1992).
44. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCErt OF LAw 171 (1st ed. 1961).
45. See SEBOK AT 160-68; see also Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at 99-102.
46. See Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein supra note 41.
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rules ....No such question can arise as to the validity of
the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it
can neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as
47
appropriate for use in this way.
Hart argued that those who thought that the rule of recognition could
not be normative within its own domain if it were not validated by the
norms of that domain did not understand how conventions worked.
He noted that "we assume, but can never demonstrate, that the standard metre bar in Paris, which is the ultimate test of correctness of all
measurement in metres, is itself correct. '48 Hart did not pull this example out of thin air. Earlier, Wittgenstein tried to explain how conventions can possess normative force by comparing the grammar of a
language game to the metre-bar in Paris:
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is
one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and
that is the standard metre in Paris. But this is, of course,
not ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to
mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring
with a metre-rule.

49

Wellington's moral conventionalism, therefore, was rooted in an
epistemology that rejected both value-free empiricism and pure conceptual analysis. The practice of social morality had to be approached
critically, not only empirically, but it could not be an exercise in individual morality. Wellington wanted to emphasize, by invoking Cavell,
that by viewing social morality as something akin to a language game,
we could get a sense of the task that he was setting out for the judge.
The job of the judge was no more conceptually intractable than that of
the grammarian.
Wellington's insistence on the possibility of viewing principle as a
social convention (and his appeal to Wittgenstein) is connected to the
two touchstones of Hart & Sacks's legal process, neutrality and institutional competency. The connection to neutrality is not difficult to see:
if the principles contained in the law are "in the law", and not the
personal (whether subjective or not) beliefs of the judge, then it is
possible for adjudication to be both neutral and concerned with moral
concepts. 50 The connection with institutional competency is some47.

HART at 108-09.

48.

HART

49.
50.

WVIITrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS supra note

See

atl09.

SEBOK at

307-12.

41 at § 50.

2000-2001]

A ROAD NOT TAKEN

thing which is worth exploring, and it shall lead to the conclusion of
this speech.
Wellington suggested that there is a connection between the fact
that the law is filled with principle and the further fact that, in common law, it is ajudge, and not another actor who is charged with interpreting the law.5 1 Wellington does not say this because he thinks that
legislators, as individuals, are less capable than judges when it comes to
analyzing our conventional morality as a language game. It is just that
as a matter of structure and as a matter of political science we know
that they are often rarely in a position to do it well: "the environment
52
in which legislators function makes difficult a bias-free perspective."
Judges, according to Wellington, are in a better position, but not because they have been schooled in moral reflection in a way that makes
them uniquely more skilled than legislatures. After all, the interpretation of social morality is a public activity which many people can do.
Law professors can do it too. But, according to Wellington, judges are
in a very good position to do it and legislatures are for a variety of
reasons in an extremely poor position to do it.
The privileging of judges is often misunderstood as a privileging
of certain persons. This may be true in Dworkin's theory but, in Hart
& Sacks's The Legal Process and Wellington's work, it is not the judge
that is privileged, but adjudication. Wellington, in fact, added an important new piece to the classic legal process account of law as adjudication by trying to connect the possibility of the neutral application of
principle by connecting principle back to adjudication and, ultimately,
to the unique institutional position of the judge. Wellington's picture
of social morality as a language game fits neatly with the idea that
judges are in a very good position to interpret the "text" of social morality. They are, as Cavell insisted, practitioners of the shared practice,
not merely observers, yet, unlike legislators, they do have the opportunity to draw back and reflect on what they have experienced and know.
Wellington's theoretical move-to connect judicial institutional
competence with the idea that principle in law is no more and no less
than social morality-may help us answer a question raised by Dean
Kronman during this symposium. Assuming that Wellington's view is
that judicial review is warranted in those cases where a constitutional
rule is based on a principle, why should we accept Wellington's hidden
premise, which is thatjudges are especially good at interpreting principles of constitutionallaw? They might be good at interpreting princi51. See CLR at 248 ("I have, by implication, claimed that courts, because they are
protected from political pressures, are better situated to deal with moral principles than

legislatures"),
52. CLR at 249.
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pies in "everyday" common law, such as tort law or contract law. But
constitutional law freights in questions that are a little bit more weighty
then just questions about how to interpret norms of commercial behavior or norms of reasonable conduct in the encounter of another motorist on the street.
Why should we believe that courts are especially good at this particular interpretative branch of our moral language game? Here I am
going to make a leap that is not in Common Law Rules, but which I think
is implicit in it because of its deep roots in The Legal Process. Hart &
Sacks had a theory about why judges were good at legal principle in
general. They believed that the position ofjudges-their very place in
relation to the question they had to answer-made them better at answering these questions than legislators (and maybe even law professors). If we are going to take seriously the claim that institutional
competency makes on behalf ofjudges, we have to know what is it that
men and women are going to do within the institution of adjudication
that marks them as different or better in comparison with legislatures.
Hart & Sacks's reason for believing that adjudication is uniquely wellsuited for principle was borrowed from Lon Fuller. It has to do with
what Fuller characterizes as the unique features of adjudication.
In The Legal Process Hart & Sacks incorporated (and reproduced)
an early version of the Fuller article that would later appear posthumously in the Harvard Law Review under the title The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication.53 Despite other differences between them, Hart &
Sacks and Fuller were in complete agreement about the centrality of
the method of adjudication in defining and patrolling law in
America. 54 For all legal process scholars, the unique features of adjudication are those things that must happen when one engages in the
process of deciding a legal dispute using either policy or principle.
Fuller laid out six criteria which are now quite familiar: 1) the process
must be adversarial, 2) the question must be initiated by one of the two
parties of interest (and not, for example, the party who will decide the
dispute), 3) decisions must be based on arguments presented to the
decider by the parties, 4) the decisions should be, in general, prospective not retroactive, 5) the decision maker must give reasons as to why
they are deciding, and 6) the decision-maker must be impartial towards parties in front of her, even if she is not indifferent to either the
55
effects of her decisions, or the reasons that she uses.
53.
54.
55.
(1978).

92 HARV L. REv. 353 (1978).
See Sebok, Reading, supra note 14 at 1583-84.
See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 383-91
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Fuller accepted that these six criteria are not always satisfied in
real life. The six criteria are aspirational. Fuller argued, and this was
echoed by Hart & Sacks and later scholars like Jim Henderson, that the
further you get from these six criteria, the further you get from adjudication, and the closer you get to something which might be called
managerial decision-making, the pure form of polycentric decision
56
making.
The six criteria of adjudication are process constraints: they are designed to take a decision maker, who, in another context (such as a
legislature) would behave one way, and guide that decision maker to
outcomes which, because of their adjudicative pedigree, are taken to
be adequate results. I want to suggest that, for a legal process theorist
like Wellington, it would make perfect sense to say that the process
constraints of adjudication are exactly the reason why judges are fit to
interpret principle, even in cases ofjudicial review. The circumstances
of adjudication, which are situational, are designed (whether consciously or not) to facilitate the interpretation of the social text of conventional morality. The fact that the six criteria of adjudication may
bear no relation to the conditions which might ideally facilitate Cavell's grammarian is not really important. That is because grammarians
are working on very different social texts.
What is important, and worth considering, is that Hart & Sacks
believed that Fuller's six constraints were extremely well suited for interpreting principle. It might be observed, in contrast, that they are
not very well suited for discovering the norms that would maximize
wealth or satisfy the greatest number of individual preferences. Decision making by expertise, or legislative bargaining are probably better
suited for these other nonlegal goals. In fact, Hart & Sacks might have
been the first to concede that, although Fuller's criteria may have been
well-suited for determining social morality, they are not especially well
suited even for determining what justice is in reality, as opposed to
what it is according to the practice of a particular people at a particular
time. But all the legal process scholars wanted to argue was that
Fuller's criteria were extremely good at determining legal principle,
regardless of its range of application or subject area. This is why Wellington was so confident that he could, at the end of Common Law
Rules, draw a connection between common law adjudication, which is
the stuff of contract and tort, and constitutional adjudication. For
Wellington, the hard part was discovering a method through which a
56. See HART & SACKS, supra note 16 at 647 ("Adjudication of disputes about managerial decisions involving the selection of a course of action for the future... is not
ordinarily satisfactory, if it is feasible at all, because of the numerous variables to be
taken into account"); see also Henderson, Process Constraintsin Tort supra note 30.
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judge could be sure of her interpretation of social morality, regardless
of whether that morality related to negligence law or abortion. That
method is the common law method. If in fact we believe that the common law method authorizes the application of principle, then we
in
should be as comfortable with the judicial application of principle
57
constitutional cases and judicial review as we are in MacPherson.
In fact, we should not only be comfortable with courts doing judicial review, we should be grateful that they do it, since if we view constitutional law as being comprised of legal principle, we would want those
principles to be interpreted under conditions designed for just this
sort of task. The method of adjudication sets out those conditions, and
since adjudication is something courts do better than any other instituan answer to those who pressed the
tion, we have the beginnings 5of
8
countermajoritarian difficulty.

57. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
58. But see Sebok, Reading, supra note 14 at 1590-91 (although Hart & Sacks expressed a strong bias towards courts, The Legal Process acknowledged that adjudicative
values (if not adjudication) could be built into administrative agencies).

